Jump to : Download | Abstract | Contact | BibTex reference | EndNote reference |


Y. Falcone, H. Marchand. Various Notions of Opacity Verified and Enforced at Runtime. Research Report INRIA, No 7349, August 2010.

Download [help]

Download paper: Adobe portable document (pdf) pdf

Copyright notice: This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. These works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder.
This page is automatically generated by bib2html v216, © INRIA 2002-2007, Projet Lagadic


{I}n this paper, we are interested in the validation of opacity where opacity means the impossibility for an attacker to retrieve the value of a secret in a system of interest. {R}oughly speaking, ensuring opacity provides confidentiality of a secret on the system that must not leak to an attacker. {M}ore specifically, we study how we can verify and enforce, at system runtime, several levels of opacity. {B}esides already considered notions of opacity, we also introduce a new one that provides a stronger level of confidentiality


Hervé Marchand http://www.irisa.fr/prive/hmarchan

BibTex Reference

   Author = {Falcone, Y. and Marchand, H.},
   Title = {{V}arious {N}otions of {O}pacity {V}erified and {E}nforced at {R}untime},
   Number = {7349},
   Institution = {INRIA},
   Month = {August},
   Year = {2010}

EndNote Reference [help]

Get EndNote Reference (.ref)

| VerTeCs | Team | Publications | New Results | Softwares |
Irisa - Inria - Copyright 2005 © Projet VerTeCs