

three-pass mutual authentication

Protocol Purpose

Two parties authenticate each other. Aim of the Mutual authentication is to make sure to each of the parties of the other's identity. In this protocol a confirmation of the successful authentication is sent by the initiator.

Definition Reference

- [CJ, ISO97]

Model Authors

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Alice&Bob style

1. B → A : Nb, Text1
2. A → B : PKa,A,{PKa,A}inv(PKs),Na,Nb,B,Text3,{Na,Nb,B,Text2}inv(PKa)
3. B → A : PKb,B,{PKb,B}inv(PKs),Nb,Na,A,Text5,{Nb,Na,A,Text4}inv(PKb)

Problems considered: 2

Attacks Found

None

Further Notes

inv(PKs) is the private key of the server C; {PKa,A}inv(PKs) is the certificate of agent A, and {PKb,B}inv(PKs) is the certificate of agent B.

HLPSL Specification

```
role iso4_Init ( A,B: agent,
                Pkb,Pks: public_key,
                Snd,Rec: channel(dy))
played_by B
def=

  local State      : nat,
        Pka       : public_key,
        Nb        : text,
        Na,Text2,Text3: text

  const ctext1,ctext4,ctext5: text

  init State := 0

  transition

  1. State = 0
    /\ Rec(start)
    =|>
    State' := 1
    /\ Nb' := new()
    /\ Snd(Nb'.ctext1)
    /\ witness(B,A,nb,Nb')

  2. State = 1
    /\ Rec(Pka'.A.{Pka'.A}_inv(Pks).Na'.Nb.B.Text3'.
           {Na'.Nb.B.Text2'}_inv(Pka'))
    =|>
    State' := 2
    /\ Snd(Pkb.B.{Pkb.B}_inv(Pks).Nb.Na'.A.ctext5.{Nb.Na'.A.ctext4}_inv(Pkb))
    /\ request(B,A,na,Na')

end role
```

```

role iso4_Resp ( B,A: agent,
                 Pka,Pks: public_key,
                 Snd,Rec: channel(dy))
played_by A
def=

  local State          : nat,
        Pkb           : public_key,
        Na            : text,
        Nb,Text1,Text4,Text5: text

  const ctext2,ctext3: text

  init State := 0

  transition

  1. State = 0
    /\ Rec(Nb'.Text1')
    =|>
    State' := 1
    /\ Na' := new()
    /\ Snd(Pka.A.{Pka.A}_inv(Pks).
           Na'.Nb'.B.ctext3.{Na'.Nb'.B.ctext2}_inv(Pka))
    /\ witness(A,B,na,Na')

  2. State = 1
    /\ Rec(Pkb'.B.{Pkb'.B}_inv(Pks).
           Nb.Na.A.Text5'.{Nb.Na.A.Text4'}_inv(Pkb'))
    =|>
    State' := 2
    /\ request(A,B,nb,Nb)

end role

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role session (A,B:agent,

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        Pka,Pkb,Pks: public_key) def=

local SA,RA,SB,RB: channel (dy)

composition

    iso4_Init(A,B,Pkb,Pks,SA,RA)
    /\ iso4_Resp(B,A,Pka,Pks,SB,RB)

end role



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role environment() def=

const na, nb          : protocol_id,
      a, b, i         : agent,
      pka, pkb, pks, pki : public_key

intruder_knowledge={a,b,pki,inv(pki),pks,
                    ctext1,ctext4,ctext5,{pki.i}_inv(pks),
                    ctext2,ctext3,{pki.i}_inv(pks)}

composition

    session(a,b,pka,pkb,pks)
    /\ session(a,i,pka,pki,pks)
    /\ session(i,b,pki,pkb,pks)

end role



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goal

%IS04_Resp authenticates IS04_Init on nb
authentication_on nb

%IS04_Init authenticates IS04_Resp on na
authentication_on na

```

end goal

environment()

References

[CJ] J. Clark and J. Jacob. A Survey of Authentication Protocol Literature: Version 1.0, 17. Nov. 1997. URL: www.cs.york.ac.uk/~jac/papers/drareview.ps.gz.

[ISO97] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 9798-3: Information technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication - Part 3: Mechanisms using digital signature techniques, 1997.